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COMMENT 
PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM 
ACT OF 1995: DO ISSUERS STILL GET 
SOAKED IN THE SAFE HARBOR? 
[T]here appears to be a growing consensus in the 
courts, at the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and in Congress that, while private securi-
ties litigation serves a role in deterring law viola-
. tions and compensating investors, the current 
system also imposes costs on issuers, on such 
professionals as accountants and attorneys who 
provide services to corporations, and ultimately, 
on investors. 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In an effort to restore investors' confidence in the securi-
ties market, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 (here-
inafter the "Securities Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (hereinafter the "Exchange Act").2 The two primary goals 
of these Acts are to promote full disclosure of information nec-
essary to make wise investment decisions and to enable corpo-
rations to raise capital.3 Since much of the information the 
issuer discloses under these Acts deals with future projections, 
the issuer4 is more susceptible to frivolous lawsuits.5 Conse-
1. Geoffrey F. Aronow & Martha L. Cochran, Shaking the Foundation of Se-
curities Suits, THE RECORDER, Jan. 6, 1995, at 8. 
2. S. REp. No. 98, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), reprinted in Congressional 
Information Service, Inc., S 243-1, at 4. 
3. 69 AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation - Federal § 64 (1993). 
4. An issuer is a person who issues or proposes to issue any security, except 
for issuance of certificates of deposit for securities, voting-trust certificates, collater-
al-trust certificates, certificates of interest or share in an unincorporated invest-
527 
1
Matteson: Soaked in the Safe Harbor
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997
528 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:527 
quently, the issuer often must expend money to defend such 
lawsuits rather than to increase the value of, or capital in, the 
company.6 
A significant conflict arising from the competing goals of 
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act centers on the disclo-
sure of forward-looking information.7 The United States Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter "SEC"), the 
courts and Congress have all made attempts to create a work-
able balance between promoting full disclosure and raising 
capital.8 The SEC adopted Rule 1759 and Rule 3b_61o to allow 
issuers to disclose forward-looking information without fear of 
defending strike suits.ll However, these rules, as applied, 
have been ineffective in curtailing litigation.12 In response, 
the courts developed the 'bespeaks caution' doctrine13 to pro-
ment trust without a board of directors or of a fixed, restricted management, or 
unit type. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(8) (1994). 
5. The more information that an issuer discloses, the more susceptible they 
are to frivolous lawsuits. 
6. J. Kenneth Blackwell, Halting 'Strike Suits' Can Give Clinton a Solid An-
chor in the Political Center, THE BOND BUYER, Nov. 20, 1995, at 33, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, Bndbyr File. Providing full and fair disclosure often does 
not promote raising capital. 69 AM. JUR. 2n Securities Regulation - Federal § 301 
(1993). 
7. A forward-looking statement is a statement of economic projections, a 
statement of management's objective for future operations, a statement of future 
economic performance or any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating 
to any of the statements already described. 17 C.F.R. 230.175(c) (1996), 17 C.F.R. 
240.3b-6(c) (1996). 
8. See generally, Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements, 59 FED. REG. 
52723 (1994). 
9. Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1996), see part II.B.2. 
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1996), see part 
II.B.2. 
11. A strike suit is a suit brought primarily for its nuisance value by a small 
shareholder whose interest in the corporation is insignificant and knowing the cost 
of defending such a suit is high, the shareholder sues hoping for a private settle-
ment. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1267 (5th ed. 1979). 
12. Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements, supra note 8, at 52728. 
13. Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosure that "Bespeaks Caution," 49 Bus. LAw. 
481 (1994) (hereinafter "Disclosure that "Bespeaks Caution""). In re Donald J. 
Trump Casino Secs. Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3rd. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 
114 S.Ct. 1219 (March 7, 1994). Under the 'bespeaks caution' doctrine a plaintiff 
cannot base a securities fraud claim on forward-looking statements if such state-
ments are accompanied with cautionary language. [d. at 371. This doctrine will 
apply to "both affirmative misrepresentations and omissions concerning soft infor-
mation" and the "cautionary language must be substantive and tailored to the 
specific future projections, estimates or opinions in the prospectus" that are chal-
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tect issuers from frivolous anti-fraud suits. 14 In order for issu-
ers to ensure protection under the 'bespeaks caution' doctrine 
they must include meaningful cautionary language with for-
ward-looking information.15 Finally, Congress acted by pass-
ing the Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995 (hereinafter 
"Reform Act"). 16 
The Reform Act intends to strike a balance between con-
trolling frivolous strike suits and safeguarding investors' rights 
by affording issuers a safe harbor protection17 when disclosing 
forward-looking statements. IS The potential for liability from 
private class actions under Rule 10b-519, due to forward-look-
lenged. Id. at 371-72. 
14. See generally, Disclosure that "Bespeaks Caution," supra note 8. 
15. In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sees. Litig., supra note 13, at 371. 
16. Private Securities Litigation Refonn Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4 (Supp. 1995». 
17. The tenn "safe harbor" refers to the granting of relief from liability if the 
actor was acting in good faith when complying with the law. BARRON'S DICTIONARY 
OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 498 (4th ed. 1995). 
18. These statements include projection of revenue, income, earnings per share, 
capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure or other financial items; plans 
and objectives of management for future operations; future economic perfonnance; 
assumptions underlying or relating to any statement concerning the above men-
tioned statements; any report by an outside reviewer retained by issuer that as-
sesses a forward-looking statement made by issuer; or statement containing a 
projection or estimate of items specified by rule or regulation by the SEC. 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(i)(1), 78u-5(i)(1) (Supp. 1995). 
19. According to SEC Rule 10b-5: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, 
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any nation-
al securities exchange, (1) to employ any device, scheme, 
or artifice to defraud, (2) to make any untrue statement 
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact nec-
essary in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or (3) to engage in any act, practice, or course 
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996). 
According to the Exchange Act § lOb: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, 
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any nation-
al securities exchange, ... (b) to use or employ, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
3
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ing statements, often inhibits communication among manage-
ment, analysts and investors thereby reducing the amount of 
information provided to the investing public.20 Consequently, 
investing becomes riskier due to the lack of information and 
the cost of raising capital increases.21 
This Comment will examine the background and develop-
ment of protection for forward-looking statements through the 
SEC, the courts and Congress. Following this background ex-
amination, Part III will focus on the recently passed Reform 
Act. This discussion will consider the arguments made by op-
ponents and proponents of the Reform Act, the effects of this 
act and whether it is encouraging disclosure by issuers and 
protecting the same issuers from frivolous lawsuits. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Securities Act in 1933 administered by the Federal 
Trade Commission was the first significant federal legislation 
regulating securities22 The following year Congress passed the 
Exchange Act.23 As part of the Exchange Act, Congress creat-
ed the SEC,24 which became responsible for administering 
both the Securities _' .. ct and the Exchange Act.25 By enacting 
tered on a national securities exchange or any security 
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations 
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors. 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). 
20. S. REp. NO 98, supra note 2, at 5. 
21. Id. 
22. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994). A security includes 
articles such as any note, stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or partici-
pation in any profit-sharing agreement, or in general, any instrument commonly 
known as a "security." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994). Although the definition of 
~security" in the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994» and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994» are slightly different, the 
two definitions are considered practical equivalents. Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 
540 F.2d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 1976), Untied Cal. Bank v. THC Financial Corp., 557 
F.2d 1351, 1356 (9th Cir. 1977) , Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 
(7th Cir. 1977). 
23. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994). 
24. 15 U.S.C:. § 78d(a) (1994). 
25. 15 U.S.C. § 778(a) (1994). 
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these Acts, Congress hoped to induce full and fair disclosure of 
necessary information and place capital in productive chan-
nels.26 
A. SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT 
OF 1934: FEDERAL LEGISLATION AIMED AT FuLL AND FAIR DIS-
CLOSURE. 
The Securities Act primarily governs the initial issuance of 
securities,27 while the Exchanges Act regulates trading in se-
curities following their initial issuance and transactions byoffi-
cers, directors and principal security holders.28 The funda-
mental purpose of both Acts is to promote full disclosure of 
information necessary for investors to make informed invest-
ment decisions.29 
The Securities Act affords protection to the naive or unin-
formed investor by deterring sellers of securities from reckless 
or fraudulent activities.30 It attempts to ensure full and fair 
disclosure regarding securities sold in the initial offering to 
prevent fraud and misrepresentation.31 Issuers of initial pub-
lic offerings must file a registration statement with the SEC 
and provide a prospectus on the securities to every purchas-
er.32 
Under the Securities Act, a registration statement and a 
prospectus must include: 1) information about the business of 
the issuer; 2) the value and number of shares offered; 3) net 
proceeds derived from any security sold by the issuer in the 
past two years; 4) a balance sheet showing all assets of the 
issuer; and 5) a profit and loss statement.33 The Securities Act 
26. 69 AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation - Federal § 64 (1993). 
27.ld. 
28. 69 AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation - Federal § 301 (1993). 
29. ld. at § 64. The Securities Act and the Exchange Act are the two principal 
federal statutes regulating the sale and distribution of securities. ld. at § 1. 
30. ld. at §§ 64, 301. 
31. ld. at § 2. 
32. ROBERT CHARLES, CORPORATE LAw 719-720 (1986). Although this is the 
general rule, the Securities Act provides exemptions based on the type of security 
(15 U.S.C. § 77c (1994» and the type of transaction initiated (15 U.S.C. § 77d 
(1994». 
33. 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1994). Schedule A provides, in detail, the information re-
5
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protects honest enterprise, helps bring available capital into 
productive channels and restores the confidence of the public 
in securities markets.3• These purposes also form the founda-
tion of the Exchange Act so that the two Acts work in harmony 
to protect the public investor.35 
When an issuer discloses information it allows investors to 
make informed investment decisions, however, it also increases 
the risk of litigation for the issuers.36 Recognizing this dilem-
ma, the SEC, the courts and Congress each attempted to devel-
op protection from litigation for issuers without unduly com-
promising the requirement for full and fair disclosure of perti-
nent information to investors.37 
B. THE SEC's APPROACH TO DISCLOSURE OF FORWARD-LoOK-
ING STATEMENTS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT AND EXCHANGE 
ACT 
Initially, the SEC prohibited the disclosure of forward-
looking information because it perceived the information as 
inherently unreliable.38 Such information includes a state-
ment of economic projections, a statement of management's 
objective for future operations, or a statement of future eco-
nomic performance. 39 
quired under 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1994) in a registration statement and under 15 
U.S.C. § 77j (1994) in a prospectus. Infonnation required in a prospectus is sub-
stantially the same as that required in the registration statement. For documents 
not required in a prospectus see 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994). 
34. 69 AM. JUR. 2n Securities Regulation - Federal § 64 (1993). 
35. Id. If an act or transaction gives rise to civil action under both Acts, the 
person wronged may rely on the provisions of both Acts in seeking a remedy. Id. 
36. 69 AM. JUR. 2n Securities Regulation - Federal § 64 (1993). 
37. See generally, Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements, supra note 8. 
38. Id. at 52723. 
39. 17 C.F.R. 230.175 (1996), 17 C.F.R. 240.3b-6 (1996). Forward-looking state-
ment also included any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any 
of the statements already described. Id. 
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1. Prior to 1979: Disclosure of Forward-looking Information 
Prohibited 
Until the passage of Rule 175 and Rule 3b-6 in 1979,40 
the SEC prohibited disclosure of forward-looking informa-
tion.41 It believed that, when investing, unsophisticated inves-
tors would rely too much on this inherently unreliable informa-
tion.42 
Notwithstanding its reservations about forward-looking 
statements, the SEC formed the Wheat Commission43 to ex-
amine the benefits of such statements.44 After studying the 
various disclosure issues, the Wheat Commission found esti-
mates of future earnings were the basis of most investment 
decisions.45 Since projections of future earnings could change 
rapidly, the Wheat Commission determined that forward-look-
ing statements would increase the risk of undue reliance on 
such projections.46 
Although the Wheat Commission advised keeping the.ban, 
the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure (hereinafter 
. "Advisory Committee")47 continued investigating possibilities 
of lifting the ban on disclosing forward-looking information.46 
4O.1d. 
41. Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements, supra note 8, at 52723. 
42. 1d. at 52723-24. 
43. Upon. recommendation of several securities analysts,' the SEC formed a 
Disclosure Policy Group (Wheat Commission) in 1969, to study a variety of disclo-
sure issues and whether projections should be permitted or mandated in SEC 
filings. 1d. at 52724. 
44.1d. 
45. 1d. 
46. Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements, supra note 8, 52724. Be-
yond the risks to the investor, such statements would increase the issuers expo-
sure to litigation and the Wheat Commission determined that these factors 
outweighed the benefits of lifting the ban. 1d. 
47. Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure was formed by the SEC in 
1976 to evaluate the Division of Corporation Finance's disclosure policies, including 
forward-looking statements. 1d. 
48. 1d. The SEC considered the issues raised by the Wheat Commission and 
conducted hearings on the issue of lifting the ban on disclosure. Based on these 
hearing and other comments, primarily from issuers, in 1973 the SEC lifted the 
ban, but did not require disclosure of forward-looking information. By lifting the 
ban, the SEC intended to regulate the disclosure of forward-looking statements 
while protecting issuers from frivolous anti-fraud litigation. Although the SEC re-
7
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In an effort to review the costs and benefits of disclosure of 
forward-looking statements, the Advisory Committee suggested 
that the SEC encourage voluntary disclosure.49 After assess-
ing these issues, the Advisory Committee recommended a safe 
harbor protecting forward-looking statements.50 This safe har-
bor would protect statements made in good faith and with a 
reasonable basis.51 Further, it recommended that cautionary 
language52 accompany the forward-looking statement indi-
cating the risks of the projections.53 The Advisory Committee 
also recommended that the person claiming fraud have the 
burden of proving the issuer made the forward-looking state-
ment without a reasonable basis or lacking good faith.54 
2. Rule 175 and Rule 3b-6: SEC Safe Harbor Provisions for 
Forward-looking Statements 
In 1979, the SEC enacted their safe harbor provision as 
Rule 175 for the Securities Act and Rule 3b-6 for the Exchange 
Act.55 Rule 175 and Rule 3b-6 protect56 issuers from lawsuits 
based on forward-looking statements made by or on behalf of 
an issuer or by an outside reviewer retained by the issuer. 57 
leased proposed guidelines, they were withdrawn due to opposition. Id. 
49. Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements, supra note 8, at 52724. 
50.Id. 
51. Id. at 52725. Purposed safe harbor rules covered all oral and written for-
ward-looking information, not just those contained in the SEC filings. Id. 
52. Cautionary language is language that explains in detail, sufficient to in-
form a reasonable person, both the approximate level of risk associated with the 
statement and the basis for the statement. Id. at 52730. 
53. Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements, supra note 8, at 52725. The 
Advisory Committee suggested the cautionary language "indicate clearly the nature 
of the projection and caution investors against ascribing undue weight thereto." Id. 
54. Id. The Advisory Committee believe the burden of proving lack of good 
faith or reasonable basis should be placed on the person bringing the anti-fraud 
cause of action. Id. 
55. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1996); 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1996). 
56. If an issuer makes a forward-looking statement within the parameters of 
Rule 175 or 3b-6, both rules provide that the statement is not a fraudulent state-
ment and therefore cannot be a bases for liability under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 
(anti-fraud provisions - see supra note 19). 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1995); 17 C.F.R. § 
240.3b-6 (1995). If an investor alleges the issuers liability upon such a forward-
looking statement they are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. FED. R. Cw. P. 12(b)(6). 
57. Neither the SEC nor Congress has defined "outside reviewed retained by 
the issuer," however, its usage in the securities industry refers to companies such 
as accounting firms. Interview with Steven R. Aaron, Vice President, Director of 
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In order to qualify for this protection the issuer must have a 
reasonable basis for making the statements or reaffirmations 
and the disclosure must be in g09d faith. 58 In addition, these 
statements must be included within a quarterly report filed 
with the SEC or in an annual report furnished to sharehold-
ers.59 
Rule 175 and Rule 3b-6 cover four categories of forward-
looking statements: 1) statements filed with the SEC in a 
quarterly report; 2) statements in an annual report to share-
holders; 3) statements made to reaffirm a forward-looking 
statement subsequent to the date of the quarterly or annual 
report that is publicly available; and 4) statement made prior 
to the SEC filing or the shareholders annual report, if the 
issuer confirms the statements in the quarterly or annual 
report.60 
As an additional condition for protection, these safe harbor 
provisions require compliance with other reporting or registra-
tion provisions of the Securities Act and Exchange Act.61 Both 
of these Rules require that an issuer subject to the Exchange 
Act to also be in compliance with the reporting requirements of 
Section 13(a) or 15(d)62 of the Exchange Act.63 If the issuer is 
not subject to these reporting requirement, the issuer must 
make the statements in a registration statement filed under 
the Securities Act in the offering statement64 or other solicita-
Compliance at Hambrecht & Quist LLC (November 26, 1995). 
58. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(a) (1996); 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6(a) (1996). 
59. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(b)(1) (1996); 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6(b)(1) (1996). 
60. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(b)(l) (1996); 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6(b)(l) (1996). 
61. [d. 
62. Issuers must file with the SEC information and documents to protect the 
investor such information to keep reasonably current information on documents 
required to be filed with an application for registration requirement and the issuer 
must file annual and quarterly reports. Exchange Act § 13(a) (15 U.S.C. § 78m 
(1994». Issuer must also file supplementary and periodic information for reports 
required pursuant to section 13. Exchange Act § 15(d) (15 U.S.C. § 780 (1994». 
63. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(b)(I)(i) (1996) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6(b)(I)(i) (1996). 
An issuer becomes subject to the Exchange Act after its initial issuance of its 
security. 
64. Neither the SEC nor Congress has defined "offering statement," however, 
its usage in the securities industry refers to any prospectus, including a private 
placement memorandum, issued on behalf of the security. Interview with Steven R. 
Aaron, Vice President, Director of Compliance at Hambrecht & Quist LLC (Novem-
ber 26, 1995). 
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tion of interest.65 
3. Infrequent Use of Safe Harbor Provisions 
Contrary to the intent of the Commission, issuers do not 
regularly utilize the safe harbor provisions of Rule 175 and 
Rule 3b-B to prevent litigation.66 Some attribute this infre-
quent use to several problems with the provision itself. 67 
These problems include limiting the safe harbor protection to 
only those documents filed with the SEC, which does not pro-
vide protection in most situations.68 Furthermore, there is 
confusion over whether issuers have a duty to correct or up-
date projections.69 Consequently, issuers often refrain from 
making the forward-looking statements.70 Additionally, uncer-
tainty still exists regarding when issuers are liable for state-
ments made by third parties.71 Finally, the courts' application 
of the safe harbor provisions does not result in quick dismissal 
of frivolous cases, therefore defendants still incur the costs the 
65. 17 C.F.R. 240.3b-6(b)(l)(i) (1996). These statements must be made under 
Regulation A or pursuant to the Exchange Act § 12(b) or (g). Neither the SEC nor 
Congress has defmed "solicitation of interest," however, its usage in the securities 
industry refers to any prospectus or other type of offering statement made by an 
underwriter. Interview with Steven R. Aaron, Vice President, Director of Compli-
ance at Hambrecht & Quist LLC (November 26, 1995). 
66. Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements, supra note 8, at 52728. 
67. ld. 
68. Since the protected forward-looking statements are only those filed with 
the SEC, it does not provide protection in most situations involving disclosure of 
forward-looking information. Many issuers face analyst and institutional demands 
for predictive information and much of communication is informal and unpredict-
able. ld. 
69. ld. at 52729. 
70. To avoid this confusion and out of fear of assuming some duty to update 
the information when circumstances change, many issuers are advised to refrain 
from making forward-looking statements in SEC filings and when speaking to 
analysts. Harvey L. Pitt and Karl A Groskaufmanis, Selective Disclosure can be 
Perilous, NAT'L L. J., Apr. 18, 1994, at B4. There is also the question as to when 
the information will need to be updated. Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking State-
ments, supra note 8, at 52729. 
71. If a corporation reviews, corrects or otherwise provides impute on analysts' 
reports, it may become sufficiently involved imposing a duty upon the corporation 
to update the statements. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2nd Cir. 
1980); Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements, supra note 8, at 52729. In 
addition, management can be subject to liability by making responses that an 
analyst's estimates are "too high," "in the ballpark," or "too low." Safe Harbor For 
Forward-Looking Statements, supra note 8, at 52729 n. 79. 
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protection strives to avoid.72 Due to these problems, commen-
tators and organizations73 alike submitted proposals to the 
SEC to amend the safe harbor provisions.74 
Some proposals have suggested expanding the coverage of 
the safe harbor to cover all forward-looking statements, regard-
less of whether filed with the SEC.75 This would extend the 
safe harbor protection to management's statements of future 
business.76 A second proposal would require issuers to formal-
ly elect a specified safe harbor disclosure program.77 The pro-
gram would require an issuer to make forward-looking disclo-
sures quarterly.7s Finally, other proposals would protect for-
ward-looking statements unless made recklessly or with an 
actual intent to deceive,79 and protect statements made on a 
reasonable basis whether filed with the SEC or not.so 
72. Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements, supra note 8, at 52728. The 
center criticism is that court will not refer to the safe harbor when applicable, 
unless raised by the defendant and a defendant will not general raise the issue. 
When the defendants raises the safe harbor provision it leads to judiCial examina-
tion of reasonableness and good faith, a factual issue, which precludes pre-discov-
ery dismissal. [d. 
73. These commentators and organizations include Association of Publicly Trad-
ed Companies, Commission Beese, Business Roundtable and National Association 
of Manufacturers, Professor John Coffee, Mr. William Freeman, Professor Joseph 
A. Grundfest, Jonathan Cuneo on behalf of the National Association of Securities 
and Commercial Attorneys, Harvey Pitt, Karl Groskaufmanis and Gilbey Strub. [d. 
at 52729 - 31. 
74. [d. at 52729. The SEC solicited public comment in their SEC release no. 
33-7101 on October 13, 1994. This release is included within 59 FED. REG. 52723. 
However, prior to making the public solicitation the SEC received comments from 
various individuals and interest groups. These comments are those referred to in 
this article. 
75. [d. at 52730. This "Heightened DefInition" proposal was submitted jointly 
by the business Roundtable and the National Association of Manufacturers. [d. 
76. Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements, supra note 8, at 52730. 
77. [d. at 52731. This "opt-in" proposal, submitted by Harvey Pitt, Karl 
Groskaufmanis and Gilbey Strub, would allow an issuer to "opt-out" by giving 30 
days notice and detail their reasons for opting out. [d. 
78. [d. 
79. [d. at 52730. Mr. William Freeman submitted this proposal and also place 
the burden of proving that when the statement was made, the issuer knew the 
projections were too high. Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements, supra 
note 8, at 52730 
80. [d. at 52731. Jonathan Cuneo on behalf of the National Association of 
Securities and Commercial Attorneys in submitting this proposal. [d. 
11
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C. THE GROWING TREND TOWARD EXPANDING SAFE HARBOR 
PROVISIONS: JUDICIALLY CREATED 'BESPEAKS CAUTION' Doc-
TRINE 
In addition to the efforts of the SEC in creating a safe 
harbor for forward-looking statements, the courts developed 
their own safe harbor provision. In doing so, the courts formu-
lated the 'bespeaks caution' doctrine to protect issuers from 
frivolous anti-fraud suits.81 
The courts first outlined the 'bespeaks caution' doctrine in 
Luce v. Edelstein.82 This doctrine protects defendants against 
claims of securities fraud if the forward-looking statements 
contain adequate cautionary language or risk disclosure.83 At 
least eight circuits embrace the protection of the 'bespeaks 
caution' doctrine. 84 
81. See generally, Disclosure that "Bespeaks Caution," supra note 13. 
82. 802 F.2d 49, 56 (2nd Cir. 1986). The challenged disclosure stated that the 
projections were "necessarily speculative," that "no assurance could be given that 
these projections would be realized," and that "actual results may vary from the 
predictions." ld. The court held that because the disclosures "clearly 'bespeak 
cautionm the disclosure was not actionable. ld. Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 
797 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977). The court held that the 
statements bespoke caution "in outlook and fell far short of the assurances re-
quired for a finding of falsity and fraud." Luce, at 806 n. 28. 
83. Disclosure that "Bespeaks Caution," supra note 13, at 481. This doctrine 
protects forward-looking statements from being the basis of a lawsuit against an 
issuer under certain circumstances. 
84. These eight circuits include the 11th, 9th, 5th, 3rd, 8th, 6th, 2nd, and 1st. 
Saltzberg v. TM SterlinglAmtin ABsocs., 45 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 1995) applied the 
"bespeaks caution" doctrine narrowly. Under this court's analysis, the cautionary 
language must be specifically related to the stated risks and boilerplate warnings 
are insufficient. ld.; In re Worlds of Wonder Sec., Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1414 (9th 
Cir. 1994) found the cautionary language repeatedly addressed the specific risks of 
the forward-looking statements. ld. at 1415; Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 
166-68 (5th Cir. 1994) considered whether under the circumstances, the omitted 
fact or unreasonable prediction altered the available public information in such a 
way that it became material to a reasonable investor in making an investment 
decision. ·ld. at 168.; In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371-73 
(3rd Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1219 (1994) if accompanied with meaning-
ful cautionary statements, forward-looking statements are not actionable as fraud 
if they do not affect the "total mix" of information. ld. at 371.; Moorhead v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 949 F.2d 243, 245-46 (8th Cir. 1991) 
held that cautionary language accompanying the forward-looking statements were 
so repetitive and specific that plaintiff could not claim fraud based on these state-
ments or underlying assumptions. ld. at 245.; Sinay v. Lamson & Seessions Co., 
948 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1991) a claim is insufficient if optimistic opinions 
12
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Courts espouse two rationales as to why cautionary lan-
guage can justify dismissal of a cause of action.85 One ratio-
nale stresses that when cautionary language acts to diminish 
the reliance upon such projections, no reasonable person could 
fmd the disclosures optimistic and, therefore, could not be 
misled.86 The second rationale embraces the idea that an in-
vestor cannot rely on disclosures, optimistic or not, if accom-
panied by cautionary language.87 Both rationales hinge on a 
determination regarding a reasonable person's perception of 
the forward-looking statements and how much weight is given 
to such statements.88 As courts vary on the basis for applying 
the 'bespeaks caution' doctrine, they also vary in their judg-
ment as to when the doctrine properly applies.89 
Some courts apply the doctrine as long as some cautionary 
language accompanies the disclosure.9o In Luce, the court 
found a simple disclaimer that projections were "necessarily 
speculative" and that "no assurance could be given that these 
projections would be realized," was sufficient to protect the 
defendant.91 Other courts require the issuer to tailor the cau-
tionary language to the specific disclosure.92 This standard 
requires cautionary language to be "substantive and tailored to 
the specific future projections, estimates or opinions in the pro-
spectus" which the plaintiffs challenge.93 These courts reason 
that vague, boilerplate warnings of potential risks are not 
sufficient to protect investors against misinformation.94 
are accompanied with cautionary language. Id. at 1040; However, this use of the 
'bespeaks caution' doctrine was limited in Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 
1993) holding plaintiffs were allowed to offer proof that statements were neither 
true nor genuinely believed regardless if accompanied with cautionary language. 
Id. at 639; I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759, 763 
(2nd. Cir. 1991) reflllled to impose liability when statements in a prospectus clear-
ly 'bespeaks caution.' Id. at 763; Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 
875, 879 (1st Cir. 1991) the issuer repeatedly warned the investor of the high 
risks associated with the investment and did not guarantee success. Id. at 879. 
85. Disclosure that "Bespeaks Caution," supra note 13, at 487. 
86.Id. 
87.Id. 
88.Id. 
89. Id. at 488. 
90. Luce, 802 F.2d at 56. 
91. Id. 
92. Disclosure that "Bespeaks Caution," supra note 13, at 488. 
93. In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d at 371-72; In re Worlds 
of Wonder Sec., Litig., 35 F.3d at 1414. 
94. In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d at 371. The cautionary 
13
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No matter how the courts apply the 'bespeaks caution' 
doctrine, it encourages disclosure of more information to inves-
tors.95 Consequently, the 'bespeaks caution' doctrine allows an 
investor to make an informed investment decision and reduces 
the issuer's risk of litigation. 
III. DISCUSSION 
Although the SEC and the courts made strides in balanc-
ing the needs of the investor and protecting the issuer, many 
believed they had not achieved a workable balance.96 In an at-
tempt to strike a workable balance between these two inter-
ests, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 (hereinafter the "Reform Act").97 
The Reform Act received both strong opposition and sup-
port, prior to and during its passage.98 However, since its 
adoption issuers99 have refrained from relying on the Reform 
Act or invoking it in litigation.loo Consequently, few courts 
have had the opportunity to apply or interpret the Reform 
Act. 101 
A. PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995: 
CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO CREATE A NEW SAFE HARBOR 
PROVISION 
The purpose of the Reform Act is to encourage meritorious . 
language provided to investors included that the casino was not completed, had no 
operating history, no history of earnings and made no assurance of profitability. 
[d. at 370-71. 
95. See generally, Disclosure that "Bespeaks Caution" supra note 13. 
96. See supra part II. 
97. 28 BNA Securities Regulation and Law Report 5 (January 5, 1996); Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4). 
98. See infra accompanying text. 
99. The Reform Act provides protection for statements made by or on behalf of 
an issuer or by an outside review retained by the issuer. A person acting or be-
half of the issuer refers to a director, officer or employee of the issuer. 15 U.S.C.S. 
§§ 77z-2(i)(6), 78u-5(i)(4). However, in order to simply the discussion· and explana-
tion of the Reform Act I will refer to this class of people as the "issuer". 
100. See infra text accompanying in part III.C. 
101. [d. 
14
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cases while discouraging abusive litigation, and thus lowering 
the cost of raising capital.102 The Reform Act amends the Se-
curities Act as § 27A and the Exchange Act as § 21E.I03 
The Reform Act includes a new safe harbor provision. 104 
Through this safe harbor provision Congress endeavors to 
protect forward-looking statementslO5 that caution the inves-
tor that actual results may significantly differ from the stated 
102. S. REP. No. 98, supra note 2, at 4. By refonning securities litigation, the 
Senate hopes to encourage the voluntary disclosure of forward-looking information, 
put investors in control of their litigation and encourage and issuers to defend 
abusive claims. Id. at 4-6. 
103. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(1995) (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4). On December 22, 1996, Congress 
voted to override President William J. Clinton's veto and passed the Reform Act 
into law. 28 BNA Securities Regulation and Law Report 3 (Jan. 5, 1996). On De-
cember 6, 1995, the Senate passed the proposed Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995 by a vote of 65 to 30. 27 BNA Securities Regulation and Law 
Report 1899 (Dec. 8, 1995). The following day the House approved the same bill 
by a vote of 320 to 102, sending the bill to President Clinton for his approval or 
vetoed. Id. After reviewing the proposed bill, President Clinton veto the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on December 19, 1995. H.R. Doc. No. 150, 
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), reprinted in Congressional Information Service, Inc., 
H270-1. Following President Clinton's veto, on December 20, 1995, the House vot-
ed to override the veto by a vote of 319-100. 28 BNA Securities Regulation and 
Law Report 5 (Jan. 5, 1996). Two days later the Senate voted 68-30 to override 
the veto, thereby passing the Act into law. Id. 
104. 15 U.S.C. § 77u-2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (Supp. 1995) in pertinent part: 
(1) [A]ny private action arising under this title that is 
based on a n untrue statement of material fact or omis-
sion of a statement of a material fact or omission of a 
material fact necessary to make the statement not mis-
leading, a person referred to in subsection (a) shall not be 
liable with respect to any forward-looking statement, 
whether written or oral, if and to the extent that-
(A) the forward-looking statement is-
(i) identified as a forward-looking statement, 
and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary 
statements identifying important factors that 
could cause actual results to differ materially 
from those in the forward looking statement; 
or 
(ii) immaterial; or 
(B) the plaintiff fails to prove that the forward-look-
ing statement-
(i) if made by a natural person, was made 
with actual knowledge by the person that the 
statement was false or misleading. . . . 
105. See supra note 18. 
15
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projections. 106 
One of the motivating factors behind the Reform Act was 
the substantial testimony regarding the high number of frivo-
lous strike suits filed in hopes of a quick settlement.107 De-
fending these frivolous lawsuits unnecessarily increases the 
cost of raising capital. 108 The Senate report found that plain-
tiffs often base these strike suits on nothing more than bad 
news concerning the company, not on fraud. 109 This appre-
hension of prosecution inhibits disclosure of forward-looking 
statements thereby depriving investors of necessary informa-
tion to make wise investment decisions. 110 
Under the Reform Act, the safe harbor provision protects 
forward-looking statements, written or oral,111 if the issuer 
identifies the statement as forward-looking and accompanies 
the statement with meaningful cautionary language. l12 The 
issuer must tailor the meaningful cautionary language to the 
106. Congress hopes to protect "projections or estimates that are identified as 
forward-looking statements and that refer clearly and proximately to the risk that 
actual results may differ materially from the projection or estimate." S. REp. No. 
98, supra note 2, at 5. According to the Senate Report, private actions brought 
under Rule 10b-5 based on forward-looking information chills communication 
among management, analysts and investors. [d. Therefore, investors receive less 
forward-looking information from corporate management about the companies. [d. 
107. [d. at 4. Various Congressmen, corporations and interest groups testified 
before the senate committee at various times during 1993 to 1995. Senate Report 
No. 98 outlines the various witnesses and the dates on which they testified. S. 
REP. No. 98, supra note 2, at 1-3. 
108. [d. 
109. [d. at 4. 
110. [d. 
111. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(2), 78u-5(c)(2) (Supp. 1995). To qualify for protection 
the oral statement must be accompanied by cautionary language identifying the 
statement as forward-looking and warns that "actual results could differ materially 
from those projected." 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(2)(A) (i), (ii), 78u-5(c)(2)(A)(i),(ii) (Supp. 
1995). In addition, the issuer must inform the investor that information concerning 
risk factors or other warning as to the forward-looking statements is available in 
a publicly available written document. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(2)(B), 78u-5(c)(2)(B) 
(Supp. 1995). 
112. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c), 78u-5(c) (Supp. 1995). If an action is based on an 
untrue statement of material fact or omission of a material fact necessary to make 
the statement not misleading, the issuer will not be liable if the issuer character-
izes the disclosure as forward-looking information and accompanies such disclosure 
with meaningful cautionary language. This cautionary language must identify the 
"substantive factors that could cause actual results to differ materially" from those 
projected in the forward-looking statement. [d. 
16
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forward-looking statement, thereby specifically disclosing the 
risks associated with the security. 113 In addition, issuers 
must disclose any assumptions upon which they base the for-
ward-looking statement and make the cautionary language 
prominent.114 If the issuer fails to do so, and does not qualify 
for the safe harbor protection, plaintiffs in § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 suits against issuers must nevertheless prove that the 
issuer had actual knowledge that the statement was false. 115 
1. Exceptions to the Safe Harbor Provisions 
Protection under the Reform Act, however, is not without 
exception.116 One exception denies protection to issuers con-
victed of certain felonies or misdemeanorsi17 or other judicial 
113. Harvey L. Pitt and Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Securities Reform Act Offers 
Limited Safe Harbor, Jan. 15, 1996, at B4, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
Ntlawj File. In this article, the authors developed· a four part analysis in creating 
"meaningful cautionary language." The first step requires the issuer to tailor the 
cautionary language specifically to the forward-looking statement avoiding 
boilerplate warnings. [d. at B4, B6. 
The second step requires the issuer to provide sufficient information on the 
risks involved in purchasing the security (so as to "present a complete picture" for 
the investor). [d. at B6. 
The third and fourth steps require theses warnings be prominent and if 
based on any assumptions, the issuer must disclose these assumptions as well. [d. 
114. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(i)(D), 78u-5(i)(D) (Supp. 1995). 
115. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(B), 78u-5(c)(I)(B) (Supp. 1995). The protection of 
forward-looking statements only applies if they are made by: 1) an issuer, who at 
the time of making the statement, is subject to reporting requirements of § 13(a) 
or § 15(d) of the Exchange Act; 2) a person acting on behalf of issuer; 3) an out-
side reviewer retained by such issuer making a statement on issuer's behalf; and 
4) an underwriter with respect to information provided by such issuer. 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77z-2(a), 78u-5(a) (Supp. 1995). An underwriter is dermed as any person who 
purchases from an issuer "with a view to, or offers or sells from an issuer in 
connection with, the distribution of any security" or directly or indirectly partici-
pates in such an undertaking or participates in underwriting such an undertaking. 
[d. Liability is avoided if the plaintiff cannot prove that the forward-looking state-
ment was made with actual knowledge by that person that it was "an untrue 
statement of a material fact or omission of a material fact necessary to make the 
statement not misleading." 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(B)(i), 78u-5(c)(I)(B)(i) (Supp. 
1995). If the forward-looking statement was made by a business entity, it was 
"made by or with the approval of an executive officer of that entity and made or 
approved by such officer with actual knowledge "that the "statement was material-
ly false or misleading. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(B)(ii), 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1995). 
116. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(b), 78u-5(b) (Supp. 1995). 
117. Any felony or misdemeanor within subdivisions (i) - (iv) of § 15(b)(4)(B) 
under the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(b)(1)(A)(i), 78u-5(b)(1)(A)(i) Supp. 
1995). These include under (I) the "taking of a false oath, making a false report, 
17
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or administrative judgementll8 rendered against them in the 
three years preceding the forward-looking information. ll9 In 
addition, the safe harbor protection does not apply to certain 
transactions, including issuance of penny stock,120 offerings of 
securities by a blank check company121 or issuances in con-
nection with a tender offer. 122 
bribery, perjury, burglary, any substantially equivalent activity"; under (ii) offenses 
arising out of conduct of the "broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer, govern-
ment securities broker, government securities dealer, investment adviser, bank, 
insurance company, fiduciary, transfer agent, foreign person performing a function 
substantially equivalent" or "entity or person required to be registered under the 
Commodity Exchange Act" or substantial equivalent; under (iii) offenses of "larce-
ny, theft, robbery, extortion, forgery, counterfeiting, fraudulent concealment, embez-
zlement, fraudulent conversion, or misappropriation of funds, securities, or substan-
tially equivalent activity"; or under (iv) offense involving "violation of §§ 152, 1341, 
1342 or 1343 or chapter 25 or 47 of title 18 of the United States Code," or sub-
stantial equivalent. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(B) (1994). 
118. A judicial or administrative judgement prohibiting future violations of the 
anti-fraud provision, or a cease and desist order from violating the anti-fraud 
provision or determines that the issuer violated the anti fraud provision of the 
securities laws. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(b)(I)(A)(ii), 78u-5(b)(I)(A)(ii) (Supp. 1995). 
119. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(b)(I)(A), 78u-5(b)(I)(A) (Supp. 1995). 
120. A penny stock is defined as 
[A]ny equity security other than one that is: 1) registered 
or approved for registration and traded on a national 
securities exchange that meets SEC criteria; 2) authorized 
for quotation on an automated quotation system sponsored 
by a registered securities association if the system was 
established and in operation before 1/1/90 and meets SEC 
criteria; 3) issued by an investment company registered 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940; 4) excluded, 
on the basis of exceeding a minimum price, net tangible 
assets of the issuer, or other relevant criteria, from the 
definition of such term by the Commission; and 5) ex-
empted conditionally or unconditionally, from the defini-
tion by rule, regulation or order of the SEC. 
15 U.S.C. § 78c (51) (1994). 
121. A blank check company is one that has not yet determined type of busi-
ness activities it will perform. Securities offered by such a company are specula-
tive. BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 51 (4th ed. 1995). 
122. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(b)(1)(B)-(E), (b)(2), 78u-5(b)(I)(B)-(E), (b)(2) (Supp. 1995). 
Other exemptions include forward-looking statement made with respect to the 
business or the issuer makes the statement in connection with a rollup transaction 
or a going private transaction. [d. In addition, the safe harbor does not protect 
statements that are included in a financial statement. [d. Other exemptions in-
clude: 1) statements contained in a registration statement of an investment compa-
ny; 2) in· connection with an initial public offering; 3) made in a disclosure of 
beneficial ownership pursuant to the Exchange Act § 13(d); 5) or those made by or 
in connection with an offering by a partnership, limited liability corporation or a 
direct participation investment program. [d. A rollup transaction is when one clos-
es out an option position and moves another one with a higher exercise price. 
18
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2. Stay of Discovery upon Motion to Dismiss 
Prior to the passage of the Reform Act a court would dis-
miss a case finding the statements in question fell within the 
safe harbor provision, but only after the company incurred the 
costs of discovery.123 In order to prevent costly discovery and 
litigation, companies reduced the amount of forward-looking 
information given to prospective investors.124 To combat this 
problem, the Reform Act provides a stay of discovery upon a 
motion to dismiss.125 With a stay on discovery, the issuer 
does not have to carry out unnecessary and costly discovery. It 
is this cost of complying with discovery that motivates many 
settlements of anti-fraud cases based on forward-looking infor-
mation.126 The stay of discovery remains in force until the 
court decides whether the issuer falls within the protection of 
the safe harbor. 127 Consequently, issuers do not incur the ex-
pense of discovery for cases the court deems frivolous. By pro-
viding this stay of discovery followed by an early dismissal 
procedure, investors will retain the right to bring suit, but 
innocent companies will not have to defend costly frivolous 
litigation.12s 
BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INvESTMENT TERMS 494 (4th ed. 1995). A 
going private transaction is when a public company becomes a private company. 
This is effectuated either by a repurchase of the company's share or when an 
outside private investor purchases all the shares. [d. at 222. Financial statements 
include a balance sheet and income statements reflecting the financial status of 
the business organization. [d. at 190. Initial Public Offering is the first time a 
corporation offers its stock to the public. [d. at 260. Beneficial ownership is when 
a person has the benefit of ownership although title is not in their name. [d. at 
46. The Exchange Act § 13(d)(1) (15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1994» requires disclosure 
if a person is the beneficial owner of more than 5% of a class of securities. 
123. Christi Harlan, SEC Seeks to Beef Up 'Safe Harbor' Provision, WALL ST. J., 
May 17, 1994, available in 1994 WL-WSJ 292188. 
124. [d. 
125. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(O, 78u-5<O (Supp. 1995). The court will stay discovery 
during the pendency of any motion by a defendant for summary judgment that is 
based on the grounds that the statement or omission is a forward-looking state-
ment and the exemption precludes a claim for relief. [d. 
126. S. REp. No. 98, supra note 2, at 6-7. 
127. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(O, 78u-5(O (Supp. 1995). 
128. SEC Seeks to Beef Up 'Safe Harbor' Provision, supra note 123, quoting Mr. 
Brent Thompson Director of Corporate Finance for the National Association of 
Manufacturers. 
19
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B. THE DEBATE OVER THE REFORM ACT 
The concern of costly litigation of frivolous suits and the 
chilling effect it has on the disclosure of information are pre-
cisely the problems Congress hopes to alleviate with the safe 
harbor provision of the Reform Act. 129 However, opponents of 
the Reform Act criticized Congress for going too far in protect-
ing corporations, meanwhile proponents argued Congress did 
not go far enough.130 The Reform Act sparked much debate 
between the competing views of investor and issuer protection. 
1. Strong Opposition to Safe Harbors: Investors Pay the Price 
for Reform by Giving Issuers a License to Lie 
Opponents of the Reform Act voiced their opposition to 
both the President and Congress.131 Many opponents believed 
the Reform Act restricts citizens from bringing lawsuits 
against dishonest investment advisors and allows "swindlers" 
to escape liability. 132 Public Citizen, a consumer advocacy 
group headed by Ralph Nader, characterized the Reform Act as 
the "Crooks and Swindlers Protection Act" saying the Reform 
Act gives executives a "license to lie. "133 Even those who 
agree that frivolous lawsuits occur, find the safe harbor provi-
sion goes beyond that necessary to curb strike suits. l34 Aside 
129. See generally, s. REp. NO. 98, supra note 2. 
130. See infra text accompanying part III.B.l. 
131. A coalition of five government groups urged their members to send letters 
to President Clinton and Congress in opposition to the compromise bill .. This coali· 
tion is comprised of Government Finance Officers Association, the National Associ-
ation of Counties, the National League of Cities, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, 
and the Municipal Treasurers' Association. Lynn Stevens Hume, Groups Send 
Letters Against Reform Bill, THE BOND BUYER, Nov. 9, 1995, at 2, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, Bndbyr File. 
132. Editorial Desk, Securities Bill Helps Swindlers Prey on Elderly, N. Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 18, 1995, § I, at 2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File . 
133. Nancy J. Kim, Proposal A License to Lie?; Foes Blast Reform of Securities 
Law, THE RECORD, Nov. 12, 1995, at B01, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
Njrec File. 
134. Securities Reform Act Goes Too Far, WIS. ST. J., Nov. 9, 1995, at 13a, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wisljl File. The writer agrees that there are 
"whining" investors who use the courts and "unscrupulous lawyers" to indemnifY 
them for their own bad investment decisions, but the bill reduces investors rights 
and allows the deceitful issuers and those connected to them to "thumb their nos-
es at the justice system." [d. 
20
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from this fear of a rise in fraud, opponents also feared that the 
Reform Act would unduly frustrate investors efforts to have 
their case heard.135 
In addition to private interest groups, some members of 
Congress also voiced opposition to the Reform Act. Representa-
tive John D. Dingell CD-Mich.) and Representative Edward J. 
Markey CD-Mass.) expressed their fear that the safe harbor 
provision would reduce effective deterrents against fraud and 
result in a chilling effect on the investing.136 They found that 
the safe harbor provision, by merely requiring general caution-
ary language, would result in the possible protection of inten-
tional fraud. 137Rep. DingeU and Rep. Markey further argued 
that this diminished deterrence, inherent in the safe harbor 
provision, would lead to an increase in fraud against the inves-
tor.13S 
2. Urging Passage of Safe Harbors: A Balance Struck to Pro-
tect both Investors and Issuers 
In response to the opposition, proponents defended the 
safe harbor provision as balanced legislation. Both SEC Chair-
man Arthur Levitt and SEC Commissioner Steven Wallman 
135. Anne Kates Smith, Some Call it Securities Reform, u.s. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, Nov. 13, 1995, at 117, available in LEXIS, News Library, Usnews File. 
Opponents include American Association of Retired Persons, Conference of Mayors 
to Consumers Union and National Association of Securities and Commercial Law 
Attorneys. [d. 
136. Dingell, Markey Knock Securities Litigation Bill Deal, NAT'L J. CONGo DAI-
LY, Nov. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cngdly File. They also argued 
that without effective deterrence against fraud, the reputation of American mar-
kets as fair and honest would be undermined. [d. 
137. William Taggart, SEC Seeks Compromise to Move Securities Litigation 
Reform Bill, WALL STREET LETTER, Nov. 13, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News 
Library, Nwltrs File. 
138. Dingell, Markey Knock Securities Litigation Bill Deal, supra note 136. (re-
porting on a letter released by House Commerce ranking member Rep. John D. 
Dingell (D-Mich), ranking minority member of the Commerce Committee and Rep. 
Edward J. Markey (D-mass) alerting Congress members that the compromise is 
"extreme and radical"); Some Call it Securities Reform, supra note 135, at 117 
(Within the article Michael Calabrese of Public Citizen, a consumer-advocacy 
group, believe investors will once again be faced with the old maxim of caveat 
emptor); Securities Reform Act Goes Too Far, supra note 134, at 13a. (the writer 
would change the name of the Securities Litigation Reform Act to White-Collar 
Criminals Freedom to Prey Act). 
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supported the Reform Act as a "workable balance" that "should 
encourage companies to provide forward-looking information to 
investors" while protecting issuers from frivolous suits. 139 The 
SEC stated that the safe harbor provision would allow for 
disclosure of forward-looking information along with safe-
guards to prevent abuse of the safe harbor.l40 
Proponents of the safe harbor provision argued that with-
out adequate information investors and those acting on their 
behalf cannot invest wisely.141 Prior to the Reform Act issuers 
refrained from providing such necessary information.142 Due 
to the potential exposure to litigation many companies have 
been hesitant to disclose forward-looking information. l43 The 
disclosure of such information would leave companies vulnera-
ble to defending frivolous suits that results in a downward 
movement in the security thereby a loss in capital for the 
small investor.1« In addition, money spent fighting these 
frivolous lawsuits hurts the investor by devaluing public com-
panies. l45 
Proponents supported the Reform Act not because it would 
prevent investors from filing lawsuits, thereby allowing issuers 
to act in a fraudulently without liability, but because it would 
139. Jeffrey Taylor, Bill Curbing Investors' Lawsuits Wins SEC Support of 'Safe-
Harbor' Provision, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1995, at A16. The SEC supported this 
provision only after Congress agreed to exclude statements covering initial public 
offering, financial statements, limited partnership, partnership "roll-up" transactions 
and penny stocks from eligibility for safe harbor. Genne Ramos, SEC Backs Key 
Provision in Securities Litigation Bill, THE REUTER BuS. REp., Nov. 17, 1995, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, Reubus File. 
140. Id. 
141. Halting 'Strike Suits' Can give Clinton Solid Anchor in the Political Cen-
ter, supra note 6, at 33. 
142. Id. 
143. Some Call it Securities Reform, supra note 135. National Association of 
Investors Corporation, who represent more than 17,000 investors clubs and over 
340,000 individual investors. Id. Securities Reform Act Offers Limited Safe Harbor, 
supra note 113, at B4. 
144. See generally, S. REP. NO. 98, supra note 2. Some Call it Securities Re-· 
form, supra note 135. 
145. Id. The Information Technology Association of America found that frivolous 
suits "increases pressure on capital sources, retards industry growth and shrinks 
the creation rate of both jobs and innovations." ITAA Backs Compromise on Securi-
ties Litigation, BuS. WIRE, Oct. 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bwire 
File. 
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prevent lawyers from creating and filing strike suits for their 
own financial benefit.l46 Attorneys often selected corporations 
to sue based on how much their stock dropped on a given 
day.147 Many of these firms has neither broken the law nor 
committed fraud, yet settled such suits because defending the 
suit exceeded the cost of settlement. l48 According to some pro-
ponents this "legalized extortion" cost U.S. companies more 
that $2.5 billion in settlements in the last four years. 149 
Meanwhile, this money could have flowed to more productive 
channels. 150 
Those that supported the Reform Act viewed it as both 
controlling frivolous suits and safeguarding investors' 
rightS. 151 Proponents considered the Reform Act a responsible 
compromise, that would protect both companies and their 
146. Some Call it Securities Reform, supra note 135, quoting Betty Sinnock, 
treasurer of the renowned Beardstown Ladies Investment Club. 
147. Penni Crabtree, Look Out, Little Guy Demons Abound in Battle Over 
Shareholder Suits, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Oct. 29, 1995, at 1-1, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, Sdut File. According in to Lynn Zempel, spokeswoman for 
the Coalition to Eliminate Abusive Securities Suits, attorneys target a company for 
lawsuits if its stock price falls ten percent or more in a single day, especially 
high-technology and biotech firms. ld. Further, Rep. Peter Deutsch (D-Fl) stated 
that many of America's most innovative growth companies are targeted for 
meritless securities suits by "professional plaintiffs." Statement from U.S. Rep. 
Peter Deutsch (D-Fl, 20th) Member of House Committee on Commerce, on Securities 
Litigation Reform Bill, Bus. WIRE, Oct. 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Bwire File. 
148. Look Out, Little Guy Demons Abound in Battle Over Shareholder Suits, 
supra note 147, at 1-1. Rep. Peter Deutsch (D-Fl) further stated that companies 
fmd it too costly to fight UIijust allegations so investors in many growth companies 
see their investment value driven down unfairly. Statement from U.S. Rep. Peter 
Deutsch (D-FI, 20th) Member of House Committee on Commerce, on Securities 
Litigation Reform Bill, supra note 147. 
149. Halting 'Strike Suits' Can give Clinton Solid Anchor in the Political Cen-
ter, supra note 6, at 33. 
150. ld. Ninety percent of strike suits settle at an average of $11 million per 
company, but in most settlements investors receive $.15 on the dollar and the 
lawyers keep the rest. Joseph Perkins, Bill Would Lessen Threats of Litigation 
Predators, RoCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Nov. 23, 1995, at 74A, available in LEXIS, 
News Library, Rmtnew File. 
151. Statement from U.S. Rep. Peter Deutsch (D-FI, 20th) Member· of House 
Committee on Commerce, on Securities Litigation Reform Bill, supra note 147. 
Information Technology Association of America, representing 6,700 direct and affili-
ate members, expressed support for the compromise bill stating it affording compa-
nies adequate protection (safe harbor) to make forward-looking statements about 
their firms, while giving investors legal remedies in those cases which are truly 
fraudulent. ITAA Back!! Compromise on Securities Litigation, supra note 145. 
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shareholders. 152 Furthermore, without a "strong, clear safe 
harbor protection, reform efforts would be virtually meaning-
less."I53 
C. THE RESPONSES AND EFFECTS OF THE REFORM ACT 
Since the passage of the Reform Act, there appears to have 
been a reduction in the number of cases filed against issuers of 
securities. l54 According to the SEC's Consumer Affairs Advi-
sory Committee, forty federal class action suits have been filed 
in contrast to 150 in a similar time period.155 However, this 
figure represents a decrease in lawsuits only within the federal 
court system.156 Instead investors are filing lawsuits against 
the issuers in state court. 157 According to one account, the 
number of cases filed in California state courts for securities 
violations since the passage of the Reform Act increased by 
500%.158 
In addition to the change in forum, disclosure of forward-
looking statements has not increased as proponents hoped. 159 
An analysis of written statements made by issuers since the 
passage of the Reform Act reveals that issuers are not making 
any new predictive statements concerning operations, future 
earning and the like.160 Issuers still refrain from making for-
152. Id. 
153. Execs Press Clinton on Safe Harbor Provision, NEW TECHNOLOGY WEEK, 
Oct. 23, 1995, available in 1994 WL 9015564. CEOs from 200 Silicone Valley high 
technology companies, including Intel, Silicon Graphics, Apple, Hewlett- Packard, 
Sun Microsystems, Oracle, Varian, Quantum and 3COM, have urges Clinton to 
sign the compromise bill. Id. 
154. Vincent R. Cappucci, Must Reliance Be Proven to Certify a Class, N. Y. J., 
Aug. 30, 1996, § Outside Counsel, at 1, available in LEXIS, LegNew Library, 
Nylawj File.; 28 BNA Securities Regulation and Law Report 914 (July 26, 1996), 
available in LEXIS, FedSec Library, Secreg File. Although there has been a drop 
in the number of federal class action suits flIed in federal court, many more cases 
were flIed in California state courts. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Must Reliance Be Proven to Certify a Class, supra note 154. 
158. Id. "More than 20 securities fraud cases have been flIed in California state 
courts." Id. 
159. Merrill B. Stone, SEC, Congress Clarify Security Disclosure Issues, NAT'L L. 
J., June 24, 1996, at B8, available in LEXIS, News Library, Ntlawj File. 
160. New 'Safe Harbor' Is not Being Well Utilized, LEGAL TIMES, July 1, 1996, § 
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ward-looking statements and their cautionary language provid-
ed is "fairly generic.,,161 Issuers apparently do not feel com-
fortable disclosing forward-looking information, and therefore 
the safe harbor provision of the Reform Act is not being uti-
lized.162 
Due to the reluctance of issuers to utilize the safe harbor 
provision of the Reform Act, few courts have had the opportu-
nity to apply or interpret the new legislation. l63 Only two 
U.S. District Court judges have had the opportunity to apply 
the Reform Act's safe harbor provision for forward-looking 
statements. l64 With such little application and interpretation, 
there is little guidance for an issuer or those acting on their 
behalf as to where the safe harbor boundaries lie. 
1. Strawbridge Sale 
The Strawbridge Sale case outlined two alternatives by 
which a· plaintiff could obtain a preliminary injunction based 
on estimated contained in a proxy statements. l65 In this case 
a shareholder, the plaintiff, filed a motion for a preliminary 
injunction to prevent Strawbridge from holding a shareholder 
meeting. l66 The plaintiff filed for the preliminary injunction 
alleging the company distributed misleading proxy statements 
undervaluing the company's liabilities.167 In order to prevail 
Special Report, Focus on Securities Law, at S29, available in LEXIS, Legnew Li-
brary, Lgltme File. Not only are the issuers continuing to release the same type of 
information prior to the passing of the Reform Act, but these statements do not 
conform with the requirements for safe harbor protection. [d. 
161. SEC, Congress Clarify Security Disclosure Issues, supra note 159, at B8. 
The SEC is considering issuing an interpretive release. [d. 
162. New 'Safe Harbor' Is not Being Well Utilized, supra note 160, at S29. 
163. NLJ Staff and Associate Press reports, Defendant Seeks Refuge in Act's 
Safe Harbor, NAT'L L. J., June 24, 1996, at B2, available in LEXIS, LegNew Li-
brary, Ntlawj File; Richenya A. Shepherd, Judge Turns Down Bid to Halt 
Strawbridge Sale, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 17, 1996, at § Business Law, 
at 9, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Lgiint File. 
164. Id.; In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16989; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P99,325 (Sept. 26, 1996). 
165. Judge Turns Down Bid to Halt Strawbridge Sale, supra note 163, at 9. 
166. Id. Strawbridge sent the proxy statements and called a shareholders meet-
ing to vote on the proposed sale of Strawbridge & Clothier to sell their stores to 
the May Department Store Co. for $600 million. Id. Lee Hoffman owned ten 
shares of Strawbridge & Clothier stock valued at $160.00. Id. 
167. [d. Hoffman claimed that the liability (warehouse leases) was $52 million 
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on this motion, the plaintiff had two alternatives. l68 The fIrst 
alternative required the plaintiff to prove that the estimates in 
the proxy statement were not forward-looking statements and, 
therefore, not protected by the safe harbor provision.169 Alter-
natively, the plaintiff would have to prove that the estimates 
were forward-looking statements unaccompanied by "meaning-
ful cautionary language."170 Furthermore, the plaintiff would 
have to show that the company had actual knowledge that the 
estimates were false or misleading, thereby losing the protec-
tion of the safe harbor provision. 171 
The plaintiff in this case was unable to prove either alter-
native. 172 The judge based his denial of the motion for a pre-
liminary injunction on three fIndings. 173 First, the judge 
found that the plaintiff did not prove the "likelihood" that the 
estimates were not forward-looking statements. 174 Second, 
the judge found that the plaintiff failed to prove the estimates 
did not have the requisite cautionary language required for the 
safe harbor protection.175 Lastly, the plaintiff did not allege 
or prove that the company had actual knowledge that the esti-
mates were false or misleading.17~ By denying the motion for 
a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff could not stop the 
shareholder's meeting. 177 
2. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia held that in ruling on a motion to dismiss based on the 
protection of the safe harbor provision, the Reform Act limits 
the court's review to statements within the complaint and 
verses $14.5 million as reported by Strawbridge in its proxy statement. [d. 
168. Judge Turns Down Bid to Halt Strawbridge Sale, supra note 164. 
169. [d. 
170. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5 (Supp. 1995). 
171. Judge Turns Down Bid to Halt Strawbridge Sale, supra note 163, at 9. 
172. [d. . 
- 173. [d. 
174. [d. 
175. [d. 
176. Judge Turns Down Bid to Halt Strawbridge Sale, supra note 163, at § 
Business Law, at 9. 
177. [d. 
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cautionary language not of material dispute. 178 In doing so, 
. the court must first determine if the cautionary language pro-
tecting the defendant from liability is in material dispute. 179 
Only after making this determination can the court consider 
whether the safe harbor will protect the defendant from liabili-
ty.1SO 
In this class action case the plaintiffs alleged that Silicon 
Graphics violated § 10(b)181 by making material misrepresen-
tations regarding the defendant's growth prospects and finan-
cial condition, and failing to disclose other adverse facts con-
cerning the company.182 In response, the defendant made a 
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).183 The defendants basis for the motion was that the 
Reform Act's safe harbor provision protected the statements. 
In deciding whether the safe harbor provision applied, the 
court had to consider whether there was cautionary language 
accompanying the forward-looking statements. The court found 
that the cautionary language proffered by the defendants was 
not contained within the complaint.184 Thus, this evidence 
was extrinsic, offered by an interested party and could be of 
material dispute. l85 Therefore, the court could not consider 
the statements in ruling on a motion to dismiss. l86 Since the 
defendants could not show, on the face of the pleadings, there 
was cautionary language accompanying the forward-looking 
statements, the court denied the motion to dismiss based on 
178. In re Silicon Graphics Inc., supra note 164, at P99,325. The court entered 
its decision on September 26, 1996. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(e), 78u-5(e) (Supp. 1995). 
179. In re Silicon Graphics Inc., supra note 164. 
180. Id. 
181. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), supra note 19. 
182. In re Silicon Graphics Inc., supra note 164. 
183. Id. FED. R. CN. P. 12(b)(6) is a motion to dismiss for a failure to state a 
cause of action. 
184. Id. The statements offered by the defendant were warning given by the 
company's CFO before two conference calls. The defendant offered a declaration by 
the CFO stating that he did read the warnings. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(e), 78u-5(e) (Supp. 1995). In re Silicon Graphics Inc., 
supra note 164. However, the court said the defendants could argue the safe har-
bor provision as grounds for a summary judgment. The court dismiss the case on 
other grounds. Id. 
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the safe harbor provision.1s7 
N. CONCLUSION 
The Refonn Act expands the protection of forward-looking 
statements from those previously provided under Rule 175 and 
Rule 3b-6, and the 'bespeaks caution' doctrine. However, issu-
ers are not changing the infonnation they disclose in reliance 
on this new safe harbor. Since issuers are not increasing dis-
closure of forward-looking infonnation, investors are not expe-
riencing an increase in fraud, as many opponents feared. How-
ever, this lack of reliance also results in investors not having 
all the necessary infonnation they may require when investing 
wisely, a concern many proponents had hoped this legislation 
would have corrected. 
Noelle Matteson· 
187. Id. 
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